


JPRS-SEA-90-008

8 MARCH 1990



**FOREIGN  
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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Asia**

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***Southeast Asia***

# East Asia Southeast Asia

JPRS-SEA-90-008

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8 MARCH 1990

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### **Sutrisno Stresses Role of Muslim Boarding Schools**

90OG0117B Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian  
26 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] Cilacap, KOMPAS—Islamic boarding schools play a very large role in efforts to preserve the unity and integrity of the nation, particularly by ensuring harmony among Indonesia's religious communities. The positive and constructive role they have demonstrated needs to be cultivated and expanded as the entire Indonesian nation faces a variety of issues and challenges while it proceeds with national development.

ABRI Commander [PANGAB] General Try Sutrisno said this Wednesday afternoon [24 January] in Cilacap (Central Java) in his remarks at a program at Kesugihan Village for commemorating the 66th anniversary of the Al-Ihya 'Ulumaddin Islamic Boarding School and for conducting the 33d memorial vow ceremony for the school's founder, K.H. Badawi Hanafi. The PANGAB asked founders of Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia to orient themselves and their organizations to the national Archipelago Concept. This concept views all aspects of land, sea, and air in the unitary state of Indonesia as a political, sociocultural, economic, and defense and security entity, an entity that is complete, unimpaired, and indivisible.

The PANGAB asked Islamic boarding schools in general, and the Al-Ihya 'Ulumaddin in particular, to train and produce true Pancasila Muslim cadres. They should be cadres for struggle and national development, cadres who possess faith, piety, and strong professionalism.

### **Vigilant**

"As religious institutions that simultaneously function as liaison between the community and the government, Islamic boarding schools have protected and trained Muslims to seek constantly and consistently the creation of unity and integrity in the Islamic community, a unity and integrity founded upon the spirit of Islamic brotherhood," Try Sutrisno said at the beginning of his remarks.

The PANGAB said that the progress of technology, especially in communications and information, affords greater opportunity for interpersonal and even international contacts. Thus, all Indonesians, particularly Muslims, must intensify their vigilance. The vigilance we need in religious life is against possible efforts to plant and spread false teachings and to deceive the Islamic community. We also need to be vigilant for attempts to set religious groups against each other and to destroy national unity and integrity.

"We need to preserve vigilance on an appropriate scale and in the right proportion. It should not be in the form of suspicion, anxiety, or pessimism, for Islam teaches its people always to think purely, positively, and optimistically."

### **Source of Motivation**

After enumerating issues related to national development, which constitutes, among other things, a process of social change, the PANGAB made appeals to Islamic boarding school leaders. First, they should always try to expand the role of religion as a source of motivation and enthusiasm for development, and as a motivator and guide for the Islamic community's potential for a more active and creative role in national development. The objective is to create a society that is more progressive and more marked by mental and spiritual health as well as physical and material health.

Second, they should always try to strengthen unity and integrity among Islamic groups as well as harmony among Indonesia's religions. In a Pancasila state, all men are viewed as created by God with the same dignity and status. There should be no differentiation of origin, race, ancestry, religion and faith, sex, skin color, or social status. Third, by knowledge, authority, and charisma, our Islamic scholars, intellectuals, young people, and Islamic boarding school leaders can protect Muslims from unhealthy and negative influences and from false teachings. This can be done by appropriately intensifying national vigilance in its proper proportions.

K.H. Achmad Badawi, principal of the Al-Ihya 'Ulumaddin Boarding School, said that the 33d memorial vow ceremony for the school's founder was not merely for enjoyment. Besides being a memorial to K.H. Badawi Hanafi, founder of the largest Islamic boarding school in the Banyumas region, he said the occasion was an excellent opportunity for total reevaluation of the school's operation, educational development, and instruction.

### **East Kalimantan Road Work To Start in Fiscal 1990-1991**

90OG0128C Jakarta ANGKATAN BERSENJATA in Indonesian 28 Jan 90 p 4

[Text] Samarinda, ANGKATAN BERSENJATA—The East Kalimantan Regional Government is very optimistic that it can build a 710-kilometer road through its northern border area.

Based on a survey, construction plans call for a road to pass through Bulungan Regency along the border with neighboring Sabah, East Malaysia, according to information ANTARA obtained last Monday [22 January] from the East Kalimantan Regional Development Planning Board (BAPPEDA) in Samarinda.

The road, on which work will begin in fiscal 1990-91, will be divided into three routes. The first route is to stretch 214 kilometers between Tanjung Palas and Malinau. The second will cover 312 kilometers between Malinau, Long Bawan, and Long Midang, and the third will run 184 kilometers between Malinau Seberang, Lumbis, and Tau Lumbis.

Plans call for most of the road to pass through forest exploitation rights (HPH) areas.

Plans developed from the survey specify that the road will be made up of 9 kilometers of asphalt surface, 52 kilometers of packed surface, 329 kilometers of dirt road, and 320 kilometers of narrow trail.

The East Kalimantan terrain is mostly hilly, but the road will cover 17 kilometers of swamp land, including 14 kilometers on the segment between Tanjung Palas and Malinau, 2 kilometers between Malinau Seberang and Linsayung, and 1 kilometer between Pa'Ibang and Long Bawan.

#### Target

Under the East Kalimantan Basic Plan for Regional Development, which seeks even distribution of development activities throughout the entire province, the land transportation sector is being given priority. Its target is the opening of a road network connecting isolated regions with government centers.

Beside developing the potential of the region, the building of the road network will also open business opportunities for the community and thus enable people to improve their welfare. The roads will also enhance security and order as part of a unified effort to improve national stability and security.

Most of the projected road will pass through areas settled by people geographically isolated by the absence of roads between villages.

For example, the 214-kilometer road between Tanjung Palas and Malinau will pass through 10 villages with a total population of 3,557.

The 312-kilometer Malinau-Long Midang road will pass through 19 villages with a total population of 4,185, and the 184-kilometer road from Malinau Seberang to Lumbis will pass through 14 villages with an overall population of 5,038.

Funds totaling 1.807 billion rupiah are needed from the APBN [National Budget] for maintaining and rehabilitating 110 kilometers of existing packed surface roads.

The rehabilitation and maintenance of roads that use 115 kilometers of former HPH roads will cost 1.579 billion rupiah, and the construction of 166 kilometers of new roads will cost more than 9.596 billion rupiah.

#### Call for New Oil Exploration Incentives

42130005A

[Editorial Report] In the 25 Jan 90 issue of Jakarta MERDEKA, Mr. Sapi-ie, Director of P.T. Rig Tenders Indonesia, a company that supports offshore oil explorations, predicts that Indonesia will have to boost oil exploration and production to meet rising demand. Currently, he says, domestic oil consumption stands at 165 million barrels a year. Mr. Sapi-ie states that only 25 percent of Indonesia's 50 billion barrels of oil reserves has been exploited, and only 10 percent of the 215 trillion cubic feet of Indonesia's gas has been tapped.

Although existing government incentives stimulated foreign companies to spend about \$2.6 billion in oil explorations in 1989, Mr. Sapi-ie urges the Indonesian government to create new economic incentives for foreign oil and gas exploration. At present, according to Mr. Sapi-ie, there are 45 foreign companies operating in 70 oil concession areas covering 818,000 square kilometers.

### **Japan Joint Venture Plans Exports**

42060007A *Vientiane PASASON in Lao* 22 Dec 89 p 2

[Excerpts] In November, the Tha Ngon Vegetable Enterprise in Vientiane Capital which we know so well became the "Champa-Sanharu Company." This company got its start from a Lao-Japanese cooperative investment effort for export-oriented food processing.

This is an equally-shared investment company worth nearly 100 million kip and operates on the principle of joint investment, with actual joint operation, equally shared profits and with a Lao as the company chief. The company's purpose is to grow and process various types of vegetables. Initially, this involves planting cucumbers on 20 hectares which will be pickled and exported to Japanese markets. The choice of cucumbers as a start is based on market needs and various other conditions. Two crops per year can be grown with a growing season of 4 months. This means that 2 crops annually can be exported. It is expected that with average yields, 1,000 tons per year will be obtained. This will amount to about 500-600 tons of pickled cucumbers.

Following a start-up period, the "Champa-Sanharu" Company began operations. Company chief Khamphai Phommamixai says that there are no problems concerning technical matters because Japanese specialists are providing guidance and equipment so nothing can go wrong. It is expected that the first crop will probably reach expectations, but that there may not be much profit because in the first year costs are high. This is because of the construction of a number of facilities and the need to obtain necessary equipment.

To date, most of the planting has been done. [Passage omitted] The first crop is expected to be harvested in April and the company's first pickles will be sold overseas.

### **SRV Role in Route 8 Construction, Progress Reviewed**

42060007A *Vientiane PASASON in Lao* 25 Dec 89 p 2

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] In the front-line office of the Route 8 Construction Company, we had the chance to chat with Comrade Khamsen Vilaivong, a member of the company's board of directors. [passage omitted]

Construction on this road began in 1984 pursuant to a cooperation agreement between Laos and Vietnam. The Vietnamese side was helping us as we split into two construction units. One began work in Vinh (SRV) and went to KM 51 (this is now finished) and another began work from KM 0 at the intersection in Ban Lao, Pakkading District in Laos going toward KM 51 (not yet completed). After the cooperation agreement was completed, the Vietnamese returned to their country and the Lao Route 8 Construction Company contracted to work on the stretch from KM 0 to KM 51.

Comrade Khamsen Vilaivong told us that "Our company was just established in 1988. There are a total of just over 200 people and we are divided into many different production units. [passage omitted] These have been spread out over Route 13 and along Route 8 since the completion of Route 9. [passage omitted] We began work in April 1988. In all, we are responsible for 51 km. This means that we began work from scratch for the entire distance—cutting a 25 meter-wide opening to build a road surface width of 8 meters, 6 meters of which will be paved. [passage omitted] The cost of construction is about 64 million kip per km as calculated from 1988. Compared to Route 9, it is one-half again as expensive since one km of Route 9 was only 32 million kip." [passage omitted]

### **Scientific, Historical Research Cooperation With Cambodia**

42060007B *Vientiane PASASON in Lao* 25 Dec 89 p 1

[Excerpt] (KPL) Laos and Cambodia have agreed to increase cooperation in the areas of scientific and historical party research. The memorandum of cooperation was signed on 21 December in Vientiane by Ounheuan Phounsavat representing the Historical Research Committee of the LPRP [Lao People's Revolutionary Party] and Chay Sophon, chief of the KPRP [Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party] Historical Research Committee. Both sides agreed that "for 1990-1991, it is necessary to exchange lessons on a regular basis, especially concerning the exchange of information. This will be used in writing the histories of the two nations' parties." [passage omitted]

### **UN Funds Help Build Luang Prabang-Xaignabouli Road**

42060009A *Vientiane PASASON in Lao*  
29 Dec 89 p 2

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The Luang Prabang-Xaignabouli Road and Bridge Company is part of the Ministry of Communications, Transport, Posts, and Construction. Its primary purpose is to restore and build three sections of the Luang Prabang-Xaignabouli highway. The first section runs from the foothills of the Phou Saken mountains to Pak Khon, a distance of 13.5 kilometers. This section is 80 percent finished and is expected to be finished this month. The second section is 26.5 kilometers long. Forty percent of the initial work has been done and is expected to be finished in 1990. The third segment is 47 kilometers long and is expected to be finished in 1991. The company is being assisted by more than 5 million dollars of international aid of which more than 4 million dollars is from the (Fernui) organization and more than 600,000 dollars is from the UN. The Lao share of the funding amounts to over 500,000 dollars. [passage omitted]

This road is 7 meters wide with a three-layer gravel surface. [passage omitted].



**Environmental Group Aid to Savannakhet District***42060008A Vientiane PASASON in Lao 26 Dec 89 p 1*

[Text] (KPL) On 4 December, the Environmental Defense and Rural Development Organization gave 117,250 dollars in aid to Nong District, Savannakhet Province for agricultural, education, public health, and women's development issues. Of that, 80,250 dollars was for agricultural assistance, 10,000 dollars was for education, 17,000 dollars for public health, and 10,000 dollars for women's work.

The education project will involve the purchase of supplies, the public health side will go for the purchase of medical supplies, and medicines. The agriculture funds will purchase water pumps and women's activities such as sewing, knitting, silk weaving and raising small livestock. Ten units of four families each will be the initial experimental group. Breed stock for pigs and chickens will be bought, fish ponds dug, 6 sewing machines will be provided along with 1 ton of cotton, 6 bicycles, and 1 motorcycle.

**Sources Comment on Economic Problems, Political Changes***90OG0116A Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 22-28 Jan 90 pp 27, 28*

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] At the beginning of 1989, Laos' policy of opening the economic door to other countries was warmly welcomed by Thai businessmen. Many investors went to Laos to present projects to the Lao government. But by the end of the year, the "tune" of the businessmen had changed. Many said that Laos was just trying to trick people. The Lao mass media responded by saying that the businessmen who had come to Laos were all agents. Thus, by the end of the year, the investment or trade environment had become very quiet.

Thai businessmen say that the Laos' investment laws are imperfect and that there is no guarantee of economic stability or security. Thus, Thai investors do not want to risk investing large sums of money there at this time. They have invested only in some small projects. In trade circles, there has been much talk about traders being tricked. Thus, it's said that Laos is a trap for Thai businessmen.

A news source said that even though the Joint Development Bank of Suwanni Phuaphairot opened in Vientiane with great fanfare, claiming to have revolving deposits of 500-600 million kip, no one is sure about the problems. This is an old matter that has never been settled by the state bank of Laos. The problem is the illegal currency exchange market, or free market. Last year, it was this market that determined the value of the kip. At the beginning of the year, the value of the kip was 18 kip to the baht. By December, the rate had moved to 28 kip to the baht. If this is allowed to continue, the banks will

become meaningless. Foreign businessmen and investors fear a situation in which just a few traders at the open-air markets can determine exchange rates. One bicycle merchant from Udon Thani was ruined because of the illegal currency market. He did not know that the exchange rate would change so quickly. [passage omitted]

**New Hope in December [passage omitted]**

Party leaders considered to be "true to Marxism-Leninism" continue to maintain a firm grip on power. This group includes Kaysone Phomvihian, Phoumi Vongvichit, Nouhak Phomsavan, Sali Vongkhamhao, Khamtai Siphandon, Sisomphon Lovansai, Sasavat Keobounphan, and Souphanouvong. Younger people are closely watching the personal behavior of these old leaders. They do not really trust them, and they have seen what happened in eastern Europe, where it was revealed that communist party leaders had cheated and used their positions to build a fortune for themselves and their families. Take Thongvin Phomvihian, the wife of Kaysone Phomvihian, for example. She has relied on her husband's prestige to collect money from villagers to build structures for white elephants. Both rural and urban people have criticized her for this. Certain Lao military leaders have had their subordinates fell trees illegally and sell them. Some intellectuals have written articles saying that things in Laos are worse than in any other country in the world, because Laos has not only "sleeping tigers" [sleeping partners] but also "sleeping elephants."

The news source stated that Prince Souphanouvong is now half paralyzed and has in effect been removed from his position as president and his position on the Politburo. But because he is revered by the people of Laos, the party is trying to promote one of his sons to a higher position within the party. Khamtai Souphanouvong is the only one of his sons to be accepted by the old powerholders in Laos.

Toward the end of the year, political observers in Laos focused their attention on elderly leaders such as Phoumi Vongvichit, Sisomphon Lovansai, Nouhak Phomsavan, and others and watched to see if they would give up their positions. Many people thought that Laos would become a republic with a president and constitution. They thought that Kaysone Phomvihian would become president and that Sali Vongkhamhao would become prime minister.

But to date, nothing has changed in Laos. The only thing is that discontent has been growing steadily among the intellectuals. And there have been political and military attacks by various right-wing Lao groups. There are about 20 such groups, but the strongest is the Free Hmong group in northern Laos, among which is the Vang Pao faction. Recently, Hmong national liberation forces ambushed government troops in Luang Prabang. Lao leaders have admitted that this happened. [passage omitted]

### **Ghafar Comments on Succession Issue**

90OG0124B Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN in Malay 28 Jan 90 p 1

[Text] Bachok—Ghafar Baba, deputy president of UMNO [United Malays National Organization], said that it is not important who will be prime minister after Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir Mohamad.

What is important, he said, is assuring the future welfare of the people. This has been the goal of the government's leaders, including Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir.

"For me, the question of who will be prime minister is not important as long as the people's welfare is assured," he said last night in a public speech at Kedai Pauh Lima, near here.

He stated that the position is not of special interest to himself, even though Datuk Sri Dr Mahathir once said he envisioned Ghafar Baba as his successor.

"In fact, I pray that Dr Mahathir will remain healthy and have a long life. I am confident that he is stronger now," he said.

Ghafar said that as a leader who has served UMNO for 40 years he is still not ready to leave the party's struggle for the people's welfare.

"That is why I always cooperated with other leaders, including Spirit of '46 President Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, who once was with me in the struggle," he said.

Because Tengku Razaleigh has deviated from their original goal and too much wants to be prime minister, they have to go separate ways, he said.

"It is more important to Tengku Razaleigh to win the prime minister's office than to work for the people. For that reason, I don't want to work with him again.

"If he is sincere about looking after the people, he may join UMNO and work in the party, for the opportunity is there," he said.

### **UMNO Vice President Comments on Political Issues**

90OG0125Z Kuala Lumpur WATAN in Malay 30 Jan 90 p 9

[Paper presented by UMNO Vice President Datuk Haji Abdullah Haji Ahmad Badawi at a University of Malaya seminar on 20 January: "Current Malay Political Leadership Issues"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] In the economic sector, Malays have achieved a higher level of success than before independence. Still, their progress is unsatisfactory when compared with the progress of non-Malays. The demand of Malays that they be given more and

better opportunities for a higher level of economic progress has become an insistence that the government cannot ignore.

### **Hope**

The implementation of the New Economic Policy (DEB) in 1971 represented new hope for Malays that they would enjoy more progress, a progress appropriate to their national status. In the more than 19 years since the DEB was initiated to give opportunities to Malays, their participation in the corporate sector today has not reached even 20 percent. Their failure to reach the 30 percent target is most disturbing. This means that in this backward condition, Malays are going to make stronger demands for more ownership and participation in the national economy. On the other hand, non-Malays feel that the DEB is a form of discrimination against them and a hindrance to the faster progress they could make. They are therefore worried about the new demands made by Malays. The DEB will end this year, and they do not want to see the creation of any economic policy like the DEB after 1990. I very much sense this fact when I examine statements made in the National Economic Consultative Council (MAPEN). It is actually very difficult to reach a consensus in this situation. The MAPEN is not an "intellectual captive market" or a market of ideas easily penetrated by any group.

Malay participation in the economy in the years to come will be an issue challenging both Malay and non-Malay political leaders. We must remember that an economic plan promising Malays a better future was one of the factors bringing success especially to the political struggle of UMNO [United Malays National Organization] and to the UMNO-led government. The future of political leaders, therefore, will depend on their success in facing these challenges and on the progress they can give to Malays.

The MAPEN, formed by the government in 1989, is a forum for reaching consensus among communal groups on economic policy after 1990. This will be the third consensus. The first intercommunity consensus produced the Constitution. The second consensus in 1971 produced the DEB and Rukunegara [Malaysian state ideology]. It is hoped that the third consensus will bring forth a policy that can carry the country, especially Malays, to a higher level of economic progress. [passage omitted]

The emergence of new political parties, social action organizations, and more tabloid newspapers critical of the government is proof that "the role of dissent" in our country is widespread and intense. Their role does not necessarily have a negative effect if they help the practice of democracy. The inclusion of delegates from the social action organizations in MAPEN is an action that should be emulated.

We should understand that the principal requirement for such healthy political participation is protection of basic rights, as provided for in the Constitution. Demands that



basic rights—like freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom of assembly—be expanded are still being made. Can the enlargement of these freedoms unite the people? Or will these freedoms possibly complicate the communal politics that still exist in our country?

### Crippled

Communal politics still control the political scene of the whole country. As long as our people are a mixture of varied ethnic groups and not a true unity, communal politics will affect the political atmosphere. If communal politics are not restrained, they will produce disorder in Malaysian society and ultimately cripple and destroy it. An undeniable fact about national politics is that communal politics will continue to be used as a tool to get public support for the parties. Communal politics are also a tool for creating unity in the communities they represent for the purpose of competing with other communities. The use of communal politics merely for creating unity in a community will have a bad effect on national unity. National unity cannot be created if each communal group gives attention to its unity mainly for competition with other groups. As long as these processes exist, national unity will be merely a dream. It is very difficult for a political leader to get unanimous support for efforts to eliminate communal fortresses and lines of division. If this situation continues, political leaders must become champions of their communities before they can be national champions.

Such communal politics also are welcomed by the mass media. Newspapers still eagerly give space and publicity to communal politics. It is the role of newspapers that brings tension to communal relations. The wide publicity given to communal politics can hurt existing ties among communities and block efforts to enhance unity.

In an open society practicing democracy, the press has an important role in disseminating information and guiding the people. Press freedom must be checked and guided by a sense of responsibility for fostering unity and must avoid creating tension among communal groups. The role of the press in disseminating information to the public is important, especially in countries where political awareness is high. The nature of an editor's role in deciding what should be published is not an easy matter to be resolved by a newspaper. In my opinion, newspapers in Malaysia prefer to be careful and to practice "self-censorship," sometimes to an extreme. If the press does not provide the information people want, it can be obtained through other communications facilities where disseminators may be irresponsible. In our country, the communications system is efficient and has wide coverage. International magazines are easy to obtain, and foreign radio broadcasts are also heard easily. I would like to recommend that newspapers, particularly the large and influential ones that understand the situation, adopt a policy of greater openness.

Besides intercommunal politics, there are also intracomunal politics. Indeed, the effect of intracomunal politics on the country cannot be disputed. People know what has happened to UMNO and its effect on the national political atmosphere. UMNO is the biggest party in Malaysia, and its leaders are leaders of the country and the people. What they do and what hurts their leadership will have an effect on the country.

The emergence of the Spirit of '46 party led by Tengku Razaleigh and its cooperation with PAS [Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party], BERJASA [Malaysian Islamic Council Front], and HAMIM [Muslim Front of Malaysia] in the The Islamic Unity Front (APU) may provide tremendous opposition to UMNO, an opposition it has never before experienced. "If the APU can truly cooperate with DAP [Democratic Action Party] to create a new coalition of opposition parties in the next elections, this development will open the way to a two-party system in this country. Whether the two-party system will be better for the practice of parliamentary democracy cannot be ascertained yet. It will be a new experience for the Malaysian people.

What is obvious from these developments is that the National Front [BN] will have tremendous opposition. The ease with which the BN gained a big victory in the last election was because the opposition parties were in disagreement. The situation has changed now.

Based on current conditions, it is my opinion that the BN will win and will be able to form a government. But will it get a two-thirds majority? This is a most interesting question for analysis and study.

For BN leaders, especially Dr Mahathir and Ghafar Baba, a BN victory with two-thirds majority is important. The two of them faced tremendous challenges in UMNO in 1987, but they won. UMNO under their leadership was dissolved on 4 February 1988 as punishment for illegalities. They were successful in reregistering UMNO, however, and they received support from more than 1.3 million members. In the international relations arena, Dr Mahathir has achieved "credibility" and a position of respect. What he needs now is a two-thirds majority victory for the BN in the next elections to prove that most of the people still support him as they did in the past.

### Guarantee

There is another aspect from which I view a two-thirds majority as important for any political party. A two-thirds majority in Parliament constitutes strength for the government to guarantee the effectiveness of Parliament and national political stability. A weak government, particularly a coalition government, often faces parliamentary problems. In Malaysia, a two-thirds majority has made our Parliament a competent and effective legislative institution. For Malaysia, with its varied and sensitive communal relationship problems, the role of the government in controlling and pacifying is important. In addition, unpopular but important legislative

steps can be taken for the good of the country. In my opinion, it is because of this two-thirds majority that the Malaysian Government has been able to guarantee security and political stability since independence, besides rapidly developing the country.

Will the BN be able to win by a two-thirds majority in the next election, as it did in the past? Maybe, they say. But this much depends on the strength of UMNO. If UMNO is strong and has enough resources and its members are truly determined to win, victory may be possible, God willing. What concerns me in UMNO, however, is that there are still factional politics that could weaken the party. Besides that, new values that emphasize competition over consensus for the sake of wealth and power are spreading in UMNO. The politics of money now have a big role. Not many people are willing to work without pay, and more and more leaders are forced to spend great sums to win even a post as branch president.

These new developments are what most concern Malays, who look at UMNO as the supporter of their nationalistic struggle and protector of their welfare. UMNO leaders must act immediately to eliminate these negative factors. They need to return to the concept that politics and the struggle are religious duties in which purity and blessing must be safeguarded.

We also see the emergence of intra-ethnic politics in Sabah and Sarawak, namely between Muslim Bumiputra [Malays and other indigenous peoples] and non-Muslim Bumiputra. These intra-ethnic politics also affect the relationship of Sabah and Sarawak with the Peninsula. Is it because a feeling of antifederalism has begun to break out in those areas? It appears that another arena of conflict has begun to emerge. If these conditions are not blocked immediately, we will see a large conflict among Bumiputra and between Muslims and Christians. Seeing that 34 BN parliamentary seats are held by Sabah and Sarawak, the BN's performance in those areas will determine if it is possible to win with a two-thirds majority. The BN now holds 135 of the 177 seats. This means that without strong support of the party's components in Sabah and Sarawak the BN will face a big problem in getting a two-thirds majority. There must be immediate, effective action to improve plans for the national integration of people in Sabah and Sarawak with people on the Peninsula at every level and in every sector. As an alternative to the Malaysian Ferry, the Malaysian Airline System (MAS) should offer low fares costing no more than the fare between Alor Setar and Kuala Lumpur or between Johor Baharu and Kuala Lumpur.

#### Enthusiasm

There is one more unhealthy sign in Malaysian society, especially among the educated urban middle class. Some of these people abstain from voting and therefore have no interest in it. This attitude of "self-disenfranchisement," or rejection of the right and responsibility to vote, is most distressing. Is this attitude

a result of lack of enthusiasm, or is it a desire not to be involved? Whatever the reason, this attitude must be abandoned. We do not want a small voter turnout to be the reason for lack of support for the party elected to govern.

In addition, I often hear of Islamic activists and preachers who have the same attitude but with the justification of not wanting to be involved in a system not founded on Islam. This is another distressing attitude. What will happen to Malay and Islamic politics if such an attitude becomes widespread?

This position of rejecting the right and responsibility to vote will not help efforts to resolve Malay or national problems. For one thing, it fails to fulfill the intent of parliamentary democracy as the basis for creating a government of the people and for the people.

Islam will remain an important issue in Malay and national politics. Islam has a role in supporting the struggle for Malay nationalism. Love for religion, race, and country is at the heart of Malay nationalism. Recent developments among young Malays indicate the existence of a conflict in their thinking between Islam and Malay nationalism. This conflict usually brings them to a rejection of Malay nationalism. There are also young Malays who consider the New Economic Policy to be anti-Islam. This situation cannot be permitted to continue. An effective program is needed immediately to give to young people a political education founded on the Malay struggle for nationalism and on the role Malays have in government and national development through intercommunal power sharing. If this is not done, a bad ideological conflict among Malays cannot be prevented any longer.

The issues and challenges I have described will continue to affect the national political situation. Malay leaders cannot escape facing them. Our leaders need great resolve and wisdom. If we want to lead the country, we must also understand the complexity of communal politics and be able to control them. We will not be successful in leading the country if we want only to lead Malays. The responsibility for providing leadership to our multiracial society will always be the greatest challenge to Malay leaders.

#### Commodities Contribute Less Than Half of National Revenues

90OG0124D Kuala Lumpur *BERITA HARIAN* in Malay 29 Jan 90 p 17

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 25 Jan—The contribution of commodity earnings (not including petroleum proceeds) to national revenues last year fell to less than 50 percent for the first time.

Total earnings from nonoil commodities last year were 20.727 billion ringgit, or 46 percent of all national income.

Still, according to Minister of Primary Industries Datuk Lim Keng Yaik, this does not mean commodity earnings declined in value, since they recorded an increase of 625.5 million ringgit over the 20.101 billion ringgit earned in 1988.

Speaking today at his office in a press conference on national commodity performance, Datuk Dr Lim said that the success of the manufacturing sector over commodity contribution to national revenues shows that the industrial program is slowly achieving its goals.

The contribution of the nonoil commodity sector to national revenues has never before dropped below 50 percent.

In 1987, the commodity sector's contribution was 58 percent, but in 1988 it fell somewhat to 53 percent.

According to Datuk Dr Lim, the timber sector, with its earnings of 8.4795 billion ringgit, remained the main contributor to commodity income. Timber was followed by [words omitted as published], 5.763 billion ringgit; rubber, 4.16 billion ringgit; minerals, 1.387 billion ringgit; cacao, 704 million ringgit; black pepper, 172.3 million ringgit; and pineapples, 59.3 million ringgit.

As of October 1989, petroleum contributed 8.722 billion ringgit, the minister said.

Datuk Dr Lim added that since 1987 the commodity sector has recorded increased earnings of about 10 billion ringgit per year.

Touching further on the performance of each commodity, he said that the rubber market is still weak because of excess latex supplies.

"The effect of latex supplies on the market is not expected to last beyond the next several months, however, since the present dry season will continue until April," he explained.

He is also confident that the average price of RSS [ribbed smoked sheets] rubber will not fall below than the current level of 224 sen per kilogram.

He said that if the price falls below that, buffer stock managers will intervene in the market to protect the price.

"I am confident that the price will increase nicely. The basis of the industry is very good, and I believe demand will exceed current offers," he stated.

With regard to oil palm products, the minister said market conditions are not very encouraging because current production is so great.

He said that India has fallen to fifth place among markets for oil palm products.

In the year [words omitted as published], our exports of oil palm products to India fell to 262,000 tons from 700,000 tons in 1988.

"This was a result of India's great success in its program for domestic cultivation of plants producing edible oils," he declared.

Singapore now emerges as the main buyer of Malaysian oil palm products, with imports of 808,000 tons. Pakistan follows with 622,000 tons, China with 480,000 tons, the Soviet Union with 377,000 tons, and Indonesia with 325,000 tons.

### Former MIC Leader Seeks To Form New Party

90OG0124C Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA in Malay 30 Jan 90 p 5

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 29 Jan—M.B. Pandithan, a former MIC [Malaysian Indian Congress] vice president who was dismissed, is willing to head the All-Malaysia Indian Progressive Federation (AMIPF), a new party still awaiting approval by the Registrar of Societies.

Pandithan, former parliamentary secretary in the Ministry of Trade and Industry, said his purpose in joining the party is to continue his work in the Indian community. He was dismissed from the MIC on 16 July 1988.

He decided to do this upon realizing that the Indian community needs an alternative party because of the disappointing actions taken in the MIC by its president, Datuk Sri Samy Vellu.

He explained, however, that the objective of the new party is not to compete with the MIC but to oppose Datuk Sri Samy Vellu.

"The MIC will be better off without Datuk Sri Samy, and when that happens I will be able to return to the party I love (MIC)," he said today following a discussion with 15 MIC veterans here.

Pandithan also said he decided to join the AMIPF after considering former Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman's advice that a new party be formed.

He met with Tunku on 16 January at Pulau Pinang and plans to meet the former prime minister one more time.

In the meeting of MIC veterans, Shaik Dawood, who was once a member of the MIC Central Working Committee, supported the recommendation by A. Krishnan of the Sitiawan MIC branch that Pandithan join the new party.

According to Pandithan, the AMIPF was formed by supporters who want him to head the new party.

The new party's application for registration was submitted last December, and K. Kanagasabai, former MIC executive secretary for the southern region, is chairman and secretary of the founding committee.

### Closed

At the time the application was submitted, Pandithan had not given a decision on whether he would join the new party, since he was still trying to reach a compromise with Datuk Sri Samy.

"Since there was no alternative, I was compelled to join this party. I know my strength in the MIC and the Indian community. About 500,000 people will follow me if I form a new party," he said.

He will try to get immediate approval of the party's application.

When asked if the door to talks with Datuk Sri Samy is closed, Pandithan, who is also a Parliament member from Tapah, said, "I had no door to close, but he (Datuk Sri Samy) was the one who closed the door.

"As I once said, I will return as a political 'Dracula' and will 'eat' Datuk Sri Samy before he eats me."

### Unemployment Lower Than Predicted

90OG0124A Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA in  
Malay 31 Jan 90 p 19

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, 30 Jan—Malaysia's unemployment this year may be far less than the official estimate of 7.6 percent if efforts to encourage geographic and occupational mobility are further expanded, the Manpower Department stated.

"The main force behind the creation of jobs in 1990 will continue to be the manufacturing sector," the department said in its latest biannual bulletin on Malaysian employment trends, published here today.

New jobs will be needed in that sector for boosting output to fill the encouraging volume of domestic and foreign orders as well as for building production facilities financed by recent investment growth, the department said.

In an overall review, the department said steadily rising economic growth caused unemployment to fall to its lowest rate of 6.2 percent in October 1989.

Traditional unemployment was greater during the first half of last year. The average unemployment during the first 10 months of last year was 7.1 percent.

Still, this was one percentage point less than the 8.1 percent unemployment rate estimated for 1988, the bulletin reported.

The department said the big drop in unemployment was a reflection of the large number of jobless who found work in 1989.

This was clearly reflected in the 24.1 percent increase in total net contributions to the Employee Savings Association. The number of new contributors rose from 226,095 in the year ending October 1988 to 280,608 in the year ending October 1989.

It is estimated that more than 280,000 new jobs will be created in 1990 if the economy maintains its recent growth rate.—BERNAMA



**AFP Reports NPA Spying for North Korea**

42000042C Manila MANILA CHRONICLE in English  
25 Jan 90 p 7

[By Manny Mogato]

[Text] Local communist guerrillas have agreed to pass "sensitive" information about the American military facilities here to North Koreans in exchange for heavy war materials, captured rebel documents said.

The documents, which were declassified by the military intelligence community, also revealed two secret meetings between the local communist rebels and representatives from the Koreans Workers Party (KWP) in a third country in Asia three years ago.

Copies of the documents were distributed to reporters by a senior intelligence official who refused to be identified. The declassified document, he claimed, was part of the voluminous documents seized from Wilma Tiamzon when she was captured in October last year.

Based on the documents, the first meeting between the local rebels and North Korean representatives was held outside the country between September 26 and October 9, 1986.

Sixto Carlos, the alleged head of the local communists international department, headed the Philippine panel. A certain Ho Dam, an alleged alternate member of the KWP Politburo, was the head of the Korean panel.

The first meeting was more on an orientation discussion between the two communist parties, explaining their policies and programs.

The second party-to-party meeting took place in May 1987 with Jose Ma. Sison and Romulo Kintanar heading the local rebels' panel. Opposite them was a certain Kye Ung Tae, another alternate member of the KWP.

The second meeting produced a more concrete agreement between the local communists and the North Koreans which was trying to make its presence felt in the region.

At least six main points were taken during the second meeting. These were: the local rebel movement has agreed to provide information about the Americans and their bases here to North Koreans; the local rebel movement has agreed to organize a solidarity organization here that would support the reunification campaign in Korea; the organization of a regional anti-imperialist movement in the Asia-Pacific region; for the Koreans' part, they have agreed to develop stronger relations between the two parties; the North Koreans also agreed to conduct exchange visits, including the sending of local rebel cadres for education and training in North Korea; and the North Koreans accepted the local rebels' request for military assistance.

**Clash in Camp New Leyte Reported**

42000042B Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English  
20 Jan 90 p 9

[Text] Camp New Leyte, Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur—Government soldiers seized yesterday what military officers described as the biggest New People's Army (NPA) camp in Mindanao, killing eight rebels and capturing 18 others, including 10 women.

Army soldiers found obstacle training facilities inside the camp, medical and lecture halls, a kitchen, a guard-house, four hectares of rice and corn fields, guns, lecture books, a tactical map, training notes, medical supplies and surgical equipment, an ammunition room, food, and anti-government documents.

Col Cristobal Gurrea, commanding officer of the 401st Infantry Brigade here, said the NPA camp was in a thickly forested mountain in Barangay Buatong, San Agustin, Surigao del Sur.

In his report to Brig Gen Rogelio Villanueva, 4th Infantry Division chief, Gurrea said eight rebels were killed, while 15 of their companions were seriously wounded.

He said the offensive started last Jan 6 when 70 NPA rebels attacked a detachment in barangay Diatagon. After the attack, two Army battalions were ordered to pursue the rebels, while other units block their way.

The troops were backed by two "Tora-Tora" planes, a Sikorsky helicopter, and two Huey helicopter gunships.

The captured rebels came from Magsaysay, Molave, and Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, and Tangub City, Gurrea said. no casualty was reported on the government side during the 14-day offensive.

Villanueva ordered Gurrea to continue pursuing the fleeing rebels who reportedly withdrew to the mountains of Agusan del Sur and Davao del Norte.

**Changes in Military Leadership**

42000042D Manila MANILA CHRONICLE in English  
30 Jan 90 p 6

[Text] Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen Renato S. de Villa has named a new intelligence chief as the military stepped up its manhunt for the remaining coup leaders.

De Villa has appointed Air Force Col Carlos Tanega as the new commander of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP) [Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines] to replace Brig Gen Galileo Kintanar who retired yesterday.

Tanega, a member of the PMA [Philippine Military Academy] class 1962 and the senior military assistant of Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos, is a seasoned intelligence officer.



He was also formerly assistant deputy chief of staff for intelligence (J-2) when Ramos was still the AFP chief of staff.

The appointment of Tanega is among the few major changes in the military's leadership following the retirement of two senior generals—Kintanar and Army Brig Gen Renato V. Palma, commander in the Visayas.

Palma relinquished his post to PC [Philippine Constabulary] Brig Gen Romeo Zulueta in a brief ceremony at Camp Lapulapu in Cebu City Sunday.

Other changes include the appointment of PC Col Miguel Fontanilla as the new PC-INP regional commander in the Cagayan Valley vice Brig Gen Pedro Sistoza who will fill up the post vacated by Zulueta as PC-INP [Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police] regional commander in the Visayas.

De Villa said they reviewed the records of at least five senior officers qualified to replace Kintanar as head of the military's undercover unit. Tanega emerged as the best choice over his classmates Brig Gen Gerardo Flores, the PC intelligence chief; Col Alfredo Filler, a former military attaché to West Germany; and Kintanar's number two man, Col Donato Quintos.

The fresh leadership in the intelligence organization would further boost the military's campaign to get all fugitive military personnel who took part in the failed coup attempt last month.

Among those still at large were Navy flag officer Domingo Calajate, dismissed Army lieutenant colonel Gregorio Honasan, demoted Air Force Lt Col Eduardo Kapunan, PC Lt Col Victor Batac, dismissed navy captain Felix Turingan and retired Air Force brigadier general Jose Ma. Zumel.

The six were considered members of the core group of coup plotters. All have a P1 million cash reward each for their arrest.

The military believed it can only put to a stop attempts against the Government if they could get all the coup leaders.

As this developed, military sources at the ISAFP said two more ranking members of the RAM-Marcos [Nationalist Reformist Movement] loyalist alliance were expected to be arrested in the next few days.

Sources said they have established the pattern of movements of Calajate and Turingan but could not find the right time to get them because of the precautionary measures the two have taken.

Several layers of security rings have been set up by the rebel military officers to protect themselves from military agents.

But members of the anti-coup Counter-Intelligence Command (CIC) remained hopeful that they can get these men very soon.

Meanwhile, de Villa confirmed reports that the rebel soldiers were indeed planning to rescue comrades who were detained inside the PC-INP stockade in Camp Crame.

De Villa described the plan as a desperate move.

#### **Paper Reports Capture of Fugitive Coup Leader Abenina**

42000043A Manila MANILA CHRONICLE in English  
31 Jan 90 p 4

[Text] The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has dealt a crippling blow to any more plans of military renegades to mount another coup with the capture last Monday of fugitive coup leader Brig. Gen Edgardo Abenina.

Abenina was a self appointed member of the military junta which the rebels had planned to replace the current Government last December. He would have outranked renegade Ex-Col Gregorio Honasan, long presumed as the leader of the power grabbers, in the hierarchy of the post-coup leadership.

The deadly duo, along with co-conspirator ex-Brig Gen Jose Zumel of the Marcos loyalists, seem to be blessed with an uncanny ability to persuade fellow soldiers to fight for the wrong. It was this strange alliance which tried to impose their bloody will on the people; they camouflaged their mutiny by invoking false patriotism even as they claimed that they were acting for the people's welfare and interests.

During the August 1987 coup attempt, Abenina had earlier revealed his treasonous bent. As the highest-ranking military officer in Recom 7 in the Visayas, he gave his full support to the attempted mutiny of Honasan in Manila.

Acting as military viceroy in that area, Abenina padlocked the civilian government offices in Cebu and held under house arrest Cebu's provincial governor and city mayor. He closed down the city's television and radio stations and allowed the inverted Philippine flag to fly at the military camps.

Abenina's short-lived bravado ended with his arrest after Honasan's troops in Manila were crushed; he was subsequently brought to Manila to face court martial proceedings for mutiny.

But the military court took an inordinately long time to decide on his case, despite the presence of evidence necessary to convict him. Worse, no one bothered to check on his activities, his "house arrest" status notwithstanding—he was free to come and go as he pleased.

Therefore Abenina was able to communicate with his co-conspirators of the December coup. By way of underscoring his ability to organize, he gives himself credit for bringing together this time the factions of Honasan's Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), and Zumel's Marcos diehard. No sooner had the coup attempt began, Abenina strolled out of detention only to emerge later, after the failed attempt, as a propaganda tactician for the scattered putschists.

A few weeks ago, he launched a psy-war in media by giving clandestine interviews to the press. He tried to create an impression of strength: he announced the imminence of another coup; he outlined the form of government he and his cohorts would put up and, in a publicized letter to a senator, he countered the AFP's statement that he is nothing but a sheer mercenary.

Throughout the post-coup period, the demagogue in Abenina invoked populist causes and issues. What he and his conspirators did not realize was that the people would not allow them to enthrone themselves at the expense of innocent lives despite their messianic importunings.

The Government, particularly the military operatives who captured Abenina, deserves to be commended for this accomplishment. The AFP also credits the civilian(s) who tipped off the military on Abenina's movements and whereabouts. This augurs well for continued cooperative efforts between government and the people in hunting down the remaining key leaders of the failed coup.

We have reason to hope that soon the rest of the fugitives will also be captured. The rebel leadership, in the wake of Abenina's fall, must be in disarray, a ripe time for the combined forces of military and civilian intelligence agencies to close in on them.

For those already behind bars such as Abenina, we expect their speedy trial. There should be no more delay in penalizing these self-proclaimed arbiters of our lives for the crimes they committed against the people and the Constitution.

### **Misuari Denies Report on Killings**

42000043B Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English  
31 Jan 90 p 8

[Text] Jiddah. Saudi Arabia (AP)—Filipino Moslem rebel leader Nur Misuari on Monday denied claims by the Philippines that Filipino Moslems were killing Christians.

Misuari, head of the Moro National Liberation Front, accused the government of circulating reports of killings in the Mindanao region in the southern Philippines as part of "a naked policy of divide and rule."

"Moslems and Christians are wise and will not allow the government propaganda to succeed," said Misuari in a

telephone interview with The Associated Press during his current visit to Saudi Arabia.

Misuari often spends time in the Saudi port city of Jiddah where the 46-member Organization of Islamic Conference [OIC] is headquartered. The OIC has played a key role in trying to arrange a peaceful settlement between the government of Corazon Aquino and the rebels. They have been waging a guerrilla war for almost two decades in quest of autonomy in 13 provinces of the southern Philippines region of the Mindanao that they consider Moslem-dominated.

Brig Gen Orlando Soriano, regional commander of North Cotabato, announced over the weekend that about 1,000 Moslem rebels attacked six predominantly Christian villages.

### **Rice Cartels Accused of Tax Evasion**

42000043C Manila MANILA CHRONICLE in English  
31 Jan 90 p 6

[By Patrick Paez and Redemto Anda]

[Text] Senator Teofisto Guingona yesterday accused the alleged cartel of rice traders, known as the "Big Seven," of tax evasion and of understating their incomes.

Guingona, in a privilege speech, said the seven Filipino-Chinese businessmen who make up the alleged cartel not only have common warehouses and trucks, but also employ the same accountants to understate their incomes and thus avoid taxes.

In 1987, for instance, the cartel leaders reported to the Government an average sale of 112,868 bags of rice per month. Guingona said this would amount to monthly gross income of P39.5 million.

Yet the Big Seven declared a gross annual income of only P29.4 million based on their 1986 income tax returns, he said.

"By no stretch of imagination can these figures be acceptable to the Government," he added.

Moreover, he said the cartel members pay an average of P12,224 each in income taxes a year. "This is even lower than what a lowly-paid public servant pays to the Government," he said.

Guingona said the Big Seven traders have also not been issuing receipts for all of their transactions in violation of the internal revenue code.

Guingona's list of alleged cartel leaders is similar to the one disclosed recently by a farmers' institute. They are Joaquin Go Soliman, president of the Confederation of Filipino Rice and Corn traders Associations and owner of Jomerc Trading at 1032 Dagupan, Tondo; Pio Sy Lato of PNS Grains in Paco; Ramn Ang Syson of Family

Native Supply in Paco; Gil Go of Jocardo Merchandising in Tondo; Santos See of Manila Goodyear in Tondo; and Teofredo Co of Teofredo Trading also in Tondo.

Guingona identified their accountants as Sixto Angeles (board certificate No. 292) and Jorge Carilimiliman (certificate No. 2088), both of whom, he added, could be keeping one set of books for all the traders.

#### **Vigilante Group Launched To Counter Threats**

42000042A Manila *MANILA CHRONICLE* in English  
20 Jan 90 p 3

[By Joey Caburnida]

[Text] A new civilian vigilante group called Metro Manila Crusaders for Peace and Democracy will be launched today by the Metropolitan Police Field Force (MPFF) to counter the growing threat of military mutiny, criminality and communist insurgency in the capital region.

This was revealed yesterday by MPFF Chief Col Romeo Maganto, who said they are expecting some 500 people to participate in the 45-day General Special Training for civilians.

Maganto also said training in martial arts and intelligence and information gathering will be given the civilians members, whom he said would not be armed. A source, however, said arms would be used by members if warranted.

The creation of such vigilante groups in Metro Manila and in the countryside had been denounced by various rights groups due to alleged human rights violations.

Maganto, however, claimed such accusations were unsubstantiated, adding that the vigilantes had been proven to be effective in the Government's campaign against insurgency. He cited the gains of the same group which he created when he was still the police station commander in Tondo.

**Editorial Fears SRV Rice Export Competition***90OG0106A Bangkok KHAO PHISSET in Thai  
8-14 Jan 90 p 5*

[Editorial: "Vietnamese Rice—A Fearsome New Competitor"]

[Excerpts] In 1989, an important phenomenon occurred with respect to Vietnam's economy. That was the first year that our communist neighbor was able to produce enough rice to satisfy domestic consumption, keep some in reserve, and export the surplus. This is the first time in 15 years that Vietnam has exported rice. Moreover, Vietnamese rice can take markets away from Thai rice. Even though Vietnam did not export very much rice last year, looking at Vietnam's production potential, there is great cause for concern regarding the future of Thai rice.

Last week, a commercial advisor attached to the Thai embassy in Colombo said that in 1990, Thailand may lose 25 percent of its market share, or 50,000 tons, in Sri Lanka to Vietnamese rice during the first round of bidding. There is no telling how much of our market we may lose in later rounds. This is the first market that Thailand has lost.

Moreover, Thailand may lose its market in Malaysia to Vietnam. In Kuala Lumpur, during the final week of December, a member of the National Rice Committee stated that this year, Malaysia plans to import rice from Vietnam in place of more expensive rice from other countries. In the near future, Malaysian officials will hold negotiations on this with Vietnamese officials.

Malaysia imports about 400,000 tons of rice a year from various countries, including Thailand. It would be a shame if Thailand loses its market in Malaysia. [passage omitted]

Vietnam's transformation from a rice importer to a rice exporter is a direct signal that Vietnamese rice, which can be produced more cheaply than Thai rice, may soon become a strong competitor of Thai rice, particularly next year, when demand for rice on world markets is expected to decline. [passage omitted]

**Foreign Minister, Aids Discuss Trade Policy***90OG0112A Bangkok MATICHON in Thai  
30 Dec 89 p 4*

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Air Chief Marshal [ACM] Sitthi Sawetsila, the minister of foreign affairs, discussed the results of the meeting of Thai ambassadors and consuls stationed in eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. This meeting, which was held at the Imperial Hotel, was organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the period 25-29 December. Reports have stated that the meeting focused exclusively on economic matters and on ensuring that the diplomats assigned to various countries are in tune with the government's policy of turning the battlefield into a marketplace. There was no opportunity for them to discuss the other problems that they face in their work. The meeting did,

however, achieve its stated objective, which was to inform the diplomats about the prime minister's policy, which they must implement in order to benefit the nation. During the meeting, the diplomats had an opportunity to discuss and exchange ideas about their work.

ACM Sitthi said that ambassadors have been charged with looking for ways to promote Thailand's markets, finding raw materials that can be used to promote Thai industry, promoting foreign investment, and encouraging Thai businessmen who want to invest abroad.

Mr Manatphat Chuto, the Thai ambassador to Moscow, said that this meeting saw the unfolding of a new style to encourage daily discussions between the mass media and those attending the meeting. The mass media was able to follow the ideas of the diplomats attending the meeting, which was very useful and which helped to resolve misunderstandings.

"It upsets me when people say that those who attended the meeting were bored and that nothing was done right. No one was bored. Everyone had a lot to do. People had to prepare data, and everyone learned something. No one was bored," said Mr Manatphat.

Mr Manatphat added that from now on, there will be greater teamwork. There will be coordination between the public sector, the private sector, and the embassies. Each side will make improvements within its field in order to promote mutual help. Also, the communications equipment will be modernized.

"The diplomats at this meeting all showed pride in the progress that has been made and the achievements scored by the country. The diplomats will improve their role and monitor the changing situation," said Mr Manatphat.

Mr Manatphat said that this meeting focused on two things, the political changes and reforms taking place in eastern Europe and the formation of a single market by the European Economic Community in 1992. Those at the meeting discussed what can be done to ensure that Thai goods can compete in eastern Europe. As for cooperation among the countries of western Europe, the diplomats discussed what needs to be improved. The diplomats made proposals concerning how to solve the problems. Their proposals will be submitted to the cabinet.

A news source who attended the meeting said that one of the complaints of ambassadors stationed in smaller countries is that these countries do not receive as much attention from the government as they should. Sometimes, when a national leader pays a visit to Thailand, they are received by someone of low rank. On some occasions, the minister has paid a visit in order to promote trade, and that country wants to trade with Thailand. But no progress is made. A joint committee is not established to discuss trade matters. But if it is a European country or the United States, the government makes a great effort to establish contact even though these countries have implemented protectionist measures affecting Thai goods.



"The policy is to find new markets. But that is all talk. One reason why Thai exports are doing so well is that the private sector has made a great effort on its own. The government apparatus is not well prepared. That is particularly true of the Economic Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**Bangkok Mayor Chamlong Advisory Team Slated**  
*90OG0123C Bangkok NAE0 NA in Thai 19 Jan 90 p 3*

[Excerpt] A report from the Governor's Office of Bangkok Metropolitan stated that on 18 January, Maj Gen Chamlong Simuong, the governor of Bangkok Metropolitan, issued Order No 213/2533 to establish an advisory team. Air Chief Marshal Arun Phromthep, who was once a suspect in the 9 September Rebellion, was appointed team leader. Other members of the advisory team include Mrs Kanlaya Bamrunghong, Mr Chaiyayan Kampanatsaenyakon, Mrs Thatsani Lapprasoet, Mr Phanu Phithakphao, Police Cpt Phanu Phinniam, Mr Suthep Athakon, Mrs Somsri Chotwi, and [naval] Cpt Sanghiam Chanchu.

In an interview, Maj Gen Chamlong said that his criteria in selecting advisors were honesty, knowledge, talent, and a willingness to devote time to the work.

"Wait just a little longer," said Maj Gen Chamlong when asked when he would appoint a secretary. [passage omitted]

**New Ground-To-Air Missile Described**  
*90OG0106B Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 15-21 Jan 90 p 11*

[Text] [Photo caption - photo not reproduced] Air force Cobra 3I missiles, which are called 2.25 missiles. They were used to destroy ground targets using the "salvo" technique, that is, firing 62 rounds simultaneously from two sets of firing tubes at the Lopburi firing range.

The aerial weapons demonstration by the air force at the aerial weapons testing grounds in Lopburi Province on 26 December 1989 was attended by the king and the Crown Prince. One of the weapons on display was a 2.25 inch missile known as the Cobra 3I, which is a ground-to-air missile of the Aerial Combat Division, RTAF [Royal Thai Air Force] Security Force. The Cobra 3I missiles were fired from two firing tubes, with each tube holding 31 rounds for a total of 62 rounds. They were fired at a ground target, not at an aerial target. The targets were located on a hill about 5 km away.

The Cobra 3I missiles are built by the Weapons Development Office of the Weapons Research and Development Center, Royal Thai Air Force. This rocket, which was developed from the "Cobra," uses a double base propellant. It is 173 mm long and has a diameter of 2.25 inches. The complete rocket weighs a 6,114.8 grams, and the propellant weighs 1,822 grams. The burning time is 1.01 seconds with a force of 610 pounds. The maximum propelling force is 670 pounds. Maximum range is 6 km.

The missile uses a contact-type war head, exploding on contact. The destructiveness of this weapon comes from the fact that it is fired in large numbers from firing tubes, each of which holds 31 missiles. This missile was developed to defend air bases/close aerial combat. It can also be used to destroy ground targets if necessary.

The air force is developing an air-to-ground missile that can be fired from an airplane or helicopter. This requires high technology but is not beyond our capabilities. The air force has already built a rocket motor assembly and a war head. However, building the control system is rather difficult. A senior air force officer said that the 70 mm rocket that is in use today was developed from the CRV-7 (Canadian Rocket Vehicle 7). We have the capabilities to build rockets. But we need to see whether it is worth the cost, that is, once we have built production plants, How many will they be able to build? If they can't produce very many, it won't be worth the cost. The rockets may cost a million baht apiece. And if we produce them in large quantities, what will we do with all of them. We could sell some of them, but it is not our policy to become an arms dealer.

As for the Cobra 3I, which is the air force's newest missile, the next step is to improve the propellant system by improving the propellant. This will require improving and strengthening the body while reducing the weight of the missile.

**SUA, WA Trafficking Armies Harass Villagers**  
*90WD0156A Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 3 Jan 90 pp 1, 19*

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] A report from a Haw Thai leader in Chiang Rai Province informed MATICHON that Haw Thai villagers in several villages are being harassed by SUA [Shan United Army] and Wa forces. In August, Special Action Unit 327 seized weapons from the villagers, which increased the threat from the SUA and Wa groups.

The report stated that the SUA and Wa are harassing the Haw Thai villagers, because these groups want the Haw Thai to join their forces. They are recruiting Haw Thai in various villages in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces. Whenever one group learns that the other is recruiting people in a certain village, it sends forces to threaten the villagers there to prevent villagers from joining the other group, saying that if they do, they will be killed. They then try to recruit the able-bodied men in the village.

"Today, they are even kidnaping young boys in order to raise them as members of their group. It has reached the point where Haw Thai are fighting against each other. Relatives are unknowingly fighting relatives just because they have been forced to join different groups," said the news source. He added that the SUA and Wa are fighting over land to grow poppies and heroin trafficking. Each group has forces to protect its opium producing areas and narcotics caravans. Whenever a group expands its area or increases the number of caravans, it needs more forces and so it tries to recruit Haw Thai. The Haw Thai



do not have any weapons with which to defend themselves, because as mentioned above, Thai soldiers have seized all their weapons.

The same report stated that villagers once went to complain to the commander of Special Action Unit 327 in Mae Rim. But when they arrived, they saw some members of Khun Sa's group and some Burmese communists in the area. Thus, they didn't dare file a complaint, because they were afraid for their safety.

"There are very few of us left. Men have been killed for refusing to join one group or another. Some people have moved elsewhere. Every family is afraid," said the news source. He added that recently, many people have fled these villages. This has angered both Khun Sa's group and the Wa. They have forbidden people to move. If people move away, even to a nearby village, they kill their relatives, even if their relatives know nothing about this.

"All the men in the villages are very afraid. They are afraid that they will be kidnaped and killed. They have gone too far. In the past, when we had weapons, we would not have put up with this. But today, we don't have anything with which to fight back," said the news source.

A Haw Thai in Chiang Mai Province told MATICHON that at the end of November, there was a clash between SUA and Wa forces. More than 200 of Khun Sa's men dressed in Thai army uniforms and led by a police inspector went to Ban Nong Uk, a Haw Thai village. They recruited men to serve as porters during the fight against the Wa at Ban Kang Ti in Burma. They were fighting over this area, because the area is very fertile and has a source of water suitable for growing opium poppies. When the Wa found out about this, they launched an attack, killing many Haw Thai.

A Haw Thai in Chiang Rai Province said that almost all of the Haw Thai village leaders have fled. From what he knows, almost all of the Haw Thai village leaders in Chiang Mai Province have fled, too, because they can't protect the villagers. He added that people are also concerned about the tourists that visit Haw Thai areas, particularly Doi Ang Khang, which is in the Wa zone of influence. If the Wa become upset with officials, they may kidnap tourists and use them as bargaining chips.

"As for how these groups threaten us, the Wa send a letter to the village, saying that if villagers do not obey or if villagers join Khun Sa's group, they will be killed. Khun Sa's group uses radios to make threats," said a Haw Thai leader. He added that both the SUA and Wa have said that they will take whatever steps necessary to keep the other from growing and to prevent the Haw Thai from joining or helping the other group. They have threatened to burn down villages and plunder Fang and Chiang Dao districts.

The same news source said that because of the difficulties in appealing to Thai officials, including both administrative and military officials, who may not be able to

help them, the Haw Thai have drafted a petition and are preparing to submit it to the king.

A reporter reported that about 2,000 Haw Thai families, or approximately 20,000 people, are threatened by the Wa and SUA. Many of these villages are located along the Thai-Burmese border and are under the supervision of Special Action Unit 327.

### Editorial Comments on Port Privatization

90OG0123A Bangkok MATICHON in Thai  
31 Jan 90 p 8

[Editorial: "A Big Mirror for PAT"]

[Excerpts] Looked at superficially, the opposition by the employees of the Port Authority of Thailand to the privatization of the Laem Chabang Port, which is now a hot news item, is a fight to preserve the interests of one particular occupational group. But if we consider this in greater depth, the interests of a particular group pose an obstacle to the interests of the nation as a whole, which will benefit from developing the port.

Furthermore, if a port is privatized, that will be tantamount to "smashing the rice bowl" of the workers at that port, who once profited both openly and secretly. [passage omitted]

Everyone agrees that the existing ports, under the control of the Port Authority of Thailand, cannot efficiently handle the increased workload stemming from the growth in imports-exports, which have been increasing greatly every year. Moreover, state capital is limited, and the state enterprise cannot mobilize capital in order to solve these problems. This is without mentioning the obstacles posed by people who try to make a profit illegally, which is the method of "gadflies" in the Port Authority. All of these things have prevented port activities from growing. In view of the fact that the government and state enterprise are incapable of satisfying the need for growth, allowing both domestic and private companies to make bids and compete in carrying on port activities is unavoidable.

At the same time, it is also proper to allow the Port Authority of Thailand to make bids, too. This will make it possible to measure the administrative efficiency of the Port Authority and tell us whether it can make a profit for the state under the same conditions affecting the private sector. [passage omitted]

There is the view that the various state enterprises will remain under the control of groups that have weapons. The fact is, these enterprises are money-making entities for senior people, who take turns coming and taking money that rightfully belongs to the public. This is a time when we are supposed to advance and become a NIC [newly industrialized country]. People hope that things will be managed in a professional and efficient manner with national interests the target. They certainly don't want people using their influence to reach their own personal goals.

## POLITICAL

### Former Saigon-Gia Dinh Resistance Fighters Club Still Active

902E0150A Paris QUE ME in Vietnamese  
Nos 105 & 106, Jan 90 p 64

[By Luu Van Khanh]

[Text] QUE ME, in its No. 104 issue, revealed the strong struggle for democracy in Vietnam of the group, Former Saigon-Gia Dinh Resistance Fighters Club, mainly by introducing to its readers in meticulous details the contents of three issues of TRUYEN THONG KHANG CHIEN (Resistance Tradition), illegally published in the country.

Following the publication of the three issues, by order of the CPV Political Bureau, the newspaper, TRUYEN THONG KHANG CHIEN, has been suspended. According to news reports received from Vietnam, Nguyen Duc Tam, head of the Organization Department of the Central Committee, threatened to act against Nguyen Ho, the publisher of TRUYEN THONG KHANG CHIEN: "If you guys continue to publish it, we will put all of you in jail!" Still according to these news reports, in spite of this threat, the former resistance fighters did not budge; however, in the end, they had to give it up: All printing houses had received orders that they should absolutely refuse to print the newspaper, TRUYEN THONG KHANG CHIEN!

Once they were unable to publish a newspaper, the former members of the Saigon-Gia Dinh resistance switched to a new formula: They now struggled by secretly printing large numbers of open letters and distributing them in all streets of Saigon. Open letters became tracts.

The latest open letter, as we have learned, appeared around August or September 1989. As to its contents, it still strongly condemned the dictatorial, authoritarian, and ruthless behavior of the CPV Central Committee. According to its authors, in the last 14 years, the CPV Central Committee had been making one mistake after another. The first and most harmful mistake was the fact that right after the capture of Saigon, the Central Committee ordered that almost all factories and major enterprises in the South be dismantled and moved to the North and directly placed under its own leadership and management. This gave people the impression that it was a looting; furthermore, it was a cause that would later lead to economic bankruptcy.

The former resistance fighters judged the policies that the Central Committee had adopted since the 6th Party Congress by saying they were "lame" and an imitation of the Chinese model, reflected only economic renovation and not political renovation, and showed that words did

not match deeds and that promises were empty and were not carried out: All of these things created profound doubts among the people.

The open letter also recalled the fact that the CPV had refused to allow changing the name of "Former Resistance Fighters Club" into "Former Resistance Fighters Association" as proposed by the former Saigon-Gia Dinh resistance fighters. That fact was mentioned once more in order to denounce the dictatorial character of the Central Committee of the CPV.

The open letter devoted the most important part to condemning the antidemocratic policies of the CPV. According to the former resistance fighters, the CPV "refused to accept dialogue and discussion and to listen to the opinions of party members and the masses, while the party and state preferred to use authoritarian and arbitrary measures or tough measures and violence (guns, electric prods, and German shepherds) to suppress the people. These facts have occurred at Cong Hoa Hamlet (Thanh Hoa Province), Tu Trinh (Thai Binh Province), Choi Nuoc, Dong Cho Ngap, and Dong Voi in Minh Hai Province. What has happened at Ho Ky Hoa (Ho Chi Minh City) ' further underscores the natural tendency of the party and state toward using an iron hand to maintain social order.

"Nobody ignores the fact that farmers were the primary force of the revolution and college students and students were the revolutionary forces in cities and that, in spite of this fact, they have been the first people receiving the shots and the injustices of German shepherds of the socialist proletarian dictatorship!"

The open letter emphasized the following:

"If this situation continues, it will be a calamity for the entire country. We hope that the party would wake up before it is too late!"<sup>2</sup>

The open letter bore the signatures of 10 leaders of the Former Saigon-Gia Dinh Resistance Fighters Club, in alphabetical order, as follows: Ho Van Chau, Ha Huy Giap, Nguyen Ho, To Ky, Pham Khai, Dao Son Tay, Nguyen Thi Hong Tam, Vo Van Thanh, Huynh Van Tieng, and Tran Van Tra.

#### Footnotes

1. See the report (on this event) in QUE ME No 102 (August 1989).

2. This quotation was based on the account made by a person inside the country.

### Report Focuses on Party Leadership Quality

902E0147A Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese  
12 Jan 90 pp 3, 4

[Investigative report by Le Huyen Thong]

[Text] Part I: Real Situation of Each Form of Basic Party Organization; Many Party Organizations and Chapters

### **Failing To Correctly Carry Out Leadership Function, Still Underestimating the Danger of Bureaucracy and Aloofness From the Masses**

How to renovate and to improve the quality of party leadership at the basic level? This was a question that was raised first in almost all the party organizations we contacted in our survey of actual situation in the last few months. In our exchanges of ideas with many secretaries of provincial, municipal, district, precinct, enterprise, and organ CPV party committees in Ho Chi Minh City, Haiphong, Hanoi, and the provinces of Hau Giang, Ha Son Binh, and Thai Binh, and in a number of units of the armed forces, we found four needs that would require early solutions. The four needs are: how to clearly determine and to correctly carry out the leadership function of each form of basic-level party organization; to perfect the core cadres; to raise the quality of party members; and to uphold the responsibilities of the superior echelons toward the basic level. These factors are closely related to and act on one another in the renovating process.

#### **Acknowledged Facts**

As we looked back at the last 3 years, one thing that was easily acknowledged was that many basic-level party organizations had been active and creative in leading the masses toward properly fulfilling political tasks, particularly bringing new mechanisms and policies into their daily life. Many basic-level party organizations succeeded in leading the achievement of the first steps toward renovating social activities along the line of democratizing, urging the masses to criticize party members, and building the basic-level party and administration. The basic-level party organizations in the armed forces led the efforts to properly fulfill the task of remaining combat ready, maintaining security, reducing the size of staffs, and renovating and raising the quality of party organization leadership in accordance with the need to change the direction of national defense and security task in the new situation. Because the machinery was consolidated, we were able to reduce by 200,000 the number of village-level leading and managerial cadres and by one-third the number of organizational contact people and the indirect staffs of enterprises, corporations, and organs. According to the results of an investigation in 30 provinces and municipalities, about 30 percent of basic-level key cadres worked effectively and showed good prospects for success. A number of localities began to consider and select cadres on the basis of appreciating talent and encouraging those who worked efficiently. Quite a few localities knew how to properly use party members being retired cadres to do proselyting work among the masses. Many villages and enterprises experimented with the model designed to reduce the size of indirect staffs by making cadres do additional work. Many localities removed from leadership positions those cadres who had been conservative and opportunistic, had oppressed the people, had been corrupt, or had proved themselves lacking the knowledge and abilities to achieve renovation in their work.

We can mention here other achievements made by the party bases which knew how to link party building with renovating the management mechanism, perfecting the machinery, renovating cadres, and raising the quality of party members along with improving the quality of party organization and chapter leadership. It is obvious that the change of mechanism has urgently required a change in the formula and substance of party building at the basic level. The point we make here is we must begin from the results of a correct evaluation of the real situation of basic-level party organizations. In reality, to evaluate the real situation of various forms of basic-level party organizations was not easy because of differences in the views on considering the matter.

#### **Where did the decline of leadership quality begin?**

Since the 6th Party Congress the basic-level party organizations have shown many weak aspects besides their achievements. The number of party bases satisfying the need for being stable and strong was declining. In the party organization of Quang Ninh Province, the number of stable and strong party bases was going down from 25.15 percent in 1986 to 22.2 percent in 1987, 19.4 in 1988, and lower in 1989. The provincial CPV committees of Quang Nam-Da Nang, Thai Binh, Ha Son Binh, Hau Giang, Song Be, and Tien Giang made the following conclusion: Many basic-level party committee echelons have not yet clearly determined nor correctly carried out the leadership function in the renovating efforts. We may say that there were many reasons behind the decline of leadership quality, but the first one was that the basic-level party organizations failed to correctly carry out their leadership function under the conditions of renovating the management mechanism. The localities that showed the three wrong tendencies, namely, "to take care of everything and to do things in their place," "to side with," and "to be formalistic and vague," belonged to various forms of basic-level party organizations.

In the case of rural and subward party bases, party committees and party chapter committees often "took care of everything and did things in the place" of the administrations and "encroached on" their managerial functions in production and business activities.

In the party bases in industrial enterprises, many projects proposed at party organization congresses sounded like reports from directors and labor unions. Proper attention was not yet paid to the control of party committees over management organs and heads of state-operated economic units. Through the investigation, in the party organizations of many enterprises in Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi, Ha Nam Ninh, and Haiphong a situation that existed in more than 90 percent of the party bases showed that secretaries and party committees "sided with" enterprise directors. The leadership role of party committee echelons in state-operated economic units was extremely blurry and was reflected quite clearly in the excessively low economic-leadership level and capabilities and in the loose party activities. In a

number of enterprises, party committees were powerless and allowed directors to control things at will or to collude with unit heads to commit negative acts in economic management. What really happened was a neglecting of the leadership role of basic-level party organizations.

The fact that the quality of the leadership of organ party organizations was declining also resulted from a lack of importance attached to the role and position of party work. Many party bases were still confused about their leadership function and, more obviously, remained "formalistic and vague." On the other hand, the party policies also did not pay proper attention to the body of party workers in organs, and the core cadres who were party chapter secretaries or held higher positions had not been properly trained in the professional aspects of the party work. The regulations on the relationships between the CPV committees and directors of organs as adopted by the Secretariat have so far failed to be materialized and fully carried out. As we conducted a fact-finding survey in 12 CPV committees subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, Ministry of Marine Products, Land Management General Department, Ministry of Home Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Inspection Commission, Ministry of Education, Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions, Vietnam News Agency, Marxist-Leninist Studies Institute, Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, and Statistics General Department, we realized more and more clearly that importance had not been attached to the role and function of the organs' party organizations and that much confusion still plagued them. The mechanism for carrying out activities of party chapters and bases at higher level had not been built and reinforced; therefore, many problems still remained to be promptly resolved, particularly in the relationships between party committees and organ leaders. It is obvious, as the reality has shown, that the renovation of the managerial mechanism also requires renovation of the mode and contents of activities, first of all correct fulfillment of the leadership function of basic-level party organizations. What is important is that party organization and chapters must set forth the right policies, strengthen control work, take part in selecting cadres, develop the vanguard role of party members in the renovating task, and strengthen the relationships between the party and the masses.

#### **Why is the body of party members numerous but not strong?**

As we sought a greater understanding of 29 provincial and municipal party organizations among those included in the recent survey, we found that renovating and raising the quality of leadership of the basic-level party organizations would first of all require a greater concern about raising the quality of the body of party members. In addition to removing decadent and deviant cadres from the party, we must regularly train and recruit new party members in accordance with the attach-importance-to-quality formula.

As of now our party has more than 2.2 million active members doing work in more than 43,000 party bases in various forms of organization. In the last few years, the party organizations each year recruited an average of more than 80,000 members and expelled from the party about 20,000 members who had become no longer qualified. Of the more than 64,000 party members who were subjected to various forms of disciplinary action in the last 2 years, nearly 9,000, or 11 percent, were committee members. That fact was something we should think seriously and worry about. The party-expanding work showed weaknesses, particularly with many party chapters having lowered the standards and failed to attach importance to teaching as motivation for prospective party members. A number of newly-recruited party members did not enjoy the masses' confidence. In Quang Ninh Province, there was a new party member who fled the country shortly after having been recruited. Therefore, in a number of party organizations, the members who were subjected to disciplinary action accounted for more than 70 percent of the total number of newly-recruited members. This fact further underlines the need for party bases to pay absolute attention to raising the quality of party members, starting with the preparations for training new members and the measures to be taken to educate probationary party members. A fact that we should be concerned about is that the so-called "average party members" account for a rather large percentage in the party membership. This percentage varies from 20-30 percent as the lowest and 60 percent as the highest. These party members do not develop their vanguard role, nor are they assigned any substantial work to do. Those "average party members" come from different groups and show different negative aspects. They are party members who really are no better than the outside people.

Through a study of the actual situation in the party organizations in the Red River delta provinces, Ho Chi Minh City, and Long An, An Giang, Song Be, and Tien Giang Provinces, the body of party members has been found to be undergoing great changes in makeup and quality. The party members who are in the rural sector account for 46 percent of the party membership, and the members who have been recruited after the liberation of the South account for 41.2 percent. Of these party members the ones who have been discharged from the army and have returned to their native villages account for 70 percent of the party membership in rural bases. This makeup clearly reflects a characteristic among party members, namely, a majority of them coming from farmers, soldiers, and cadres of administrative and professional organs. The number of party members who are workers directly doing productive work is too few (8.7 percent). In the party organization of Thai Binh Province, retired cadres account for nearly 26 percent of its membership and discharged soldiers, 40 percent, and in some localities 80 percent. The average age of party members in this provincial party organization is quickly rising (36.8 years of age).



Everybody knows that since the 6th Party Congress the party mass-proselyting work has shown much progress toward renovation and democratization. The proselyting work among youths, workers, farmers, women, and intellectuals at the basic level has contributed to creating initial changes on the economic front and revitalizing the democratic atmosphere in the social life. However, in the spirit of daring to face the truth many basic-level party organizations still underestimate the danger of bureaucracy and aloofness from the masses. More than 85 percent of the party members who took part in a poll admitted that they never achieved or had no ability to do good mass-proselyting work. In many localities, party organizations and chapters still operated as "clans," with respect for family order and for older people running down from grandparents, parents, uncles, and remote relatives, both paternal and maternal. The so-called "our family party chapter" and "our clan party chapter" were not an isolated phenomenon. Many party chapters had very occasional activities, which were poor in terms of contents, and did not discuss democracy and very seldom debated the relationships between the party and the masses. It is obvious that if democracy is not extended first from the party, the latter can hardly promote the people's ownership right. The fact that many party chapters operate without correct directions and underestimate the mass-proselyting work can easily make cadres and party members see only their own power, see no strength of the people, and only see themselves standing above the people and not among the people and for the people.

The real situation as we mentioned above is exactly what the CPV Central Committee's Resolution 5 had to say, "The body of cadres and party members is numerous but generally not strong, while in many aspects their background and capabilities are still poor, with the understanding of ideals and quality of a number of party members being decreased to a worrisome low point."

(Next issue: Part II - The Weaknesses of Basic-Level Party Organizations Should Be Viewed From Two Directions)

## MILITARY

### Military Region 7 Focusing on Weapons, Ammunition Storage

902E0153B Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 31 Dec 89 pp 1, 4

[Excerpt] During the past few years, despite many difficulties in material and technological facilities, expenses and technical equipment, and the many hardships in daily activities and living conditions, weapons and ammunition units of the Military Region 7 technical sector have exerted efforts to build storage buildings and repair shops, improve transportation routes, and repair living quarters and storage yards for good management and maintenance and timely support of the training and combat missions. The units established logbook and

statistical systems and organized ranks of responsible cadres and men from the agency to the primary unit level to grasp the capabilities and conditions of vehicles, machinery, equipment, and ammunition. A number of types of weapons and ammunition captured from the enemy have received quality and technical inspection, and have been classified and introduced to a plan of rational use and maintenance. Recently acquired weapons and equipment have been placed in warehouses to ensure the technical standards of thorough maintenance and to facilitate management and use. Due to these efforts, the weapons and ammunition sector of Military Region 7 have made many achievements in the fight to protect the southwestern border and fulfill the international obligation in the fraternal country of Cambodia, and to support the training of units in the rear.

However, in the management, use, and maintenance of weapons and ammunition during the past few years, there are still weaknesses such as: the tasks of statistically evaluating, classifying, and ascertaining the various types and quality of weapons and ammunition have not been regularly conducted, with losses still occurring in a number of units and transportation organizations; distribution has not created favorable conditions for supporting unit combat and training requirements; regulations for preventing fires and explosions have not been properly executed; and the situation of cadres and men in a number of warehouse units and management agencies is still lax.

Recently, Military Region 7 has concentrated on strengthening and building a weapons and ammunition warehouse system following the new mission capabilities of the military region. [passage omitted]

### Officer Stresses Good Relations With Local People

902E0155A Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Maj. Gen. Ha Kien Thiet, Deputy Commander of the Communications and Liaison Service]

[Excerpts] To maintain prompt, accurate, secret and safe communications and liaison under any condition to support the leadership and command of all echelons, the communications and liaison troops must rely on the people and be screened and protected by the people. Only with the assistance of the people are the communications and liaison troops able to protect their forces and swiftly restore equipment damaged by natural disaster and enemy action, and firmly maintain communications and liaison. [passage omitted]

However, the problem presented is that during the past few years, disciplinary infractions against the people by the military in general and among the communications troops in particular have been increasing with no small number of serious incidents, perpetrated not only by new soldiers and young cadres but even by party members and management cadres. What is the cause? Most leaders



agree there is a need for thorough and objective evaluation in a spirit of strict criticism and self-criticism. However, truly sadly and unacceptably, the evaluation method of a number of individuals both inside and outside the army is that: due to these new times in which everything has been downgraded, the quality of military-civilian relations has changed. This answer is erroneous, is an attitude lacking responsibility, and is indifferent toward the mission of caring for, maintaining, and developing the tradition of military-civilian relations. Our army has always been a child of the people. Only in this manner can we understand why, when there is peace in the country, that in the border and island locations, our soldiers must still sacrifice their blood to protect each sacred bit of land and the lives and property of the people. Troops, no matter where stationed, all receive wholehearted assistance from the local administration and people, and the people receive assistance from the troops in repelling negativism, developing production, and maintaining order and social security.

In all violations involving military discipline and military-civilian relations, there is cooperation between the troops and the party organization, administration, and people in the area where troops are located to find the reasons and to set forth methods of overcoming the problem. For example, at an isolated post protecting a communications landline in Bac Thai Province, soldier Nguyen Van X was bribed by a wrongdoer to cut and sell wire. The people promptly discovered the break and when repeated, they met, determined the date and sent someone to inform the unit commander. When the unit cadres came to the post to inspect, the people told the unit commander, "On the day you do not come, we will have someone to inform the unit the next day."

Unfortunately, in a few places at the present time, when violations of military discipline and military-civilian relations occur and are well known, the local party organization, administration, people, and troop unit draw back to a position of "independence" and "non-intervention," allowing small violations to become large ones instead of being swiftly and completely resolved and allowing them to drag on to create serious consequences. [passage omitted]

### **Few Applicants Choosing Officer Schools**

902E0153A Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in  
*Vietnamese* 28 Dec 89 pp 1, 4

[Article by Quang Thong]

[Text] During the past few years, recruiting of students for officers training schools has been confronted with a difficult situation. None of the young people wish to become officers and a "rush" exists to enter rear services and finance schools. For the schools considered most important and initial gateways in training future commanders of the army such as Infantry Officers School 1, the Political-Military School, etc., recruiting is extremely difficult.

After one propaganda campaign, including collective motivation and direct meetings with cadres, the results of a recruiting drive for officers training schools in Division B37 were as follows: Infantry Officers School 1: 1 man of the 15 needed; Political-Military Officers School: 2 men of the 10 needed; Air Defense Officers School: none of the 5 needed; Communications Officers School: none of the 3 needed; Armor Officers School: 1 of the 3 needed; Rear Services Officers School: 6 men for the 5 needed; Finance Officers School: 5 men for the 1 needed.

What do these figures say? If the results of recruiting for the Rear Services Officers School and Finance Officers School are observed, the conclusion that a number of these men are giving special attention to a pragmatic way of life is truly unsatisfactory. However, if the overall ratio of the schools above is considered as a normal phenomenon, it is truly alarming. Clearly, the future of military professional routes selected by the young is closely connected with their need for ensuring economic life. It is not because that by becoming rear services and finance officers that their salaries would be higher than that of other officers but actually—and fairly simply—that material and finance management officers have better "conditions" for improving their income.

The general thinking of young and future officers is that to become an officer closely connected throughout life with the army—is not too appealing. They feel a loss because the life of a soldier is arduous. Many young officers believe that the "sound" of their salary is large but the "size" is not. Comparing the pay of an army officer with that of a cadre or civil servant in an administrative or professional agency is irrational. However, their pay and privileges are less than those received by sectors of the most tedious work in society. This is because not one business or production unit in our country receives only the wages stipulated by the state. Only army officers receive salaries of "three stacks of 3 dong," with no monthly or quarterly productivity bonuses like business and production units. Therefore, although army wages have special and longevity allowances, when rations are subtracted, they are too low.

We once attended a debate held by students in Infantry Officers School 1 to discuss the reasons why this school had the greatest recruiting difficulty of all schools in the army. We learned a fact extremely worthy of concern. For some courses, due to extremely difficult recruiting and many dropouts, the school has been forced to lower the recruiting levels. The students were nearly all from the rural area, near the end of their enlistments, and with low educational levels. When asked why he entered the school, one replied, "If I return home, I would have to work in the fields. If I had a trade to make some money, I would surely not be here." We also once visited a fighter air force unit. The jet pilot officers complained that their life was "too poor" and their wages were not enough to raise a family; and that aerial acrobatics and exercises were conducted daily. Some reflected that a

transfer due to declining health to the piloting of transport aircraft would be truly "good fortune!" We sympathize and never consider these thoughts to be negative, only that in renovation of the revolution today, such a widespread situation is something we cannot avoid.

A sociological investigation would show that a majority of families do not wish their children to enter the army. Most soldiers do not wish to perform long-term service in the army. These facts confirm one reality: that army life is arduous and impoverished, and that each man constantly accepts and shoulders sacrifice and loss.

Along with the concern and care of the entire army and people, on this great anniversary of the army, in conjunction with total renovation of the quality of educational work giving officers training schools an ideological and intellectual attraction for the young, we wish to contribute the following few suggestions:

- The state (sectors, echelons, and local areas) must cooperate with the army in properly handling reduction of the standing army, consistent with practical conditions.
- Redesignate army officer systems, policies, and wages, ensuring within the overall situation of the entire country, that army officers receive salaries equivalent to the early 1960's.

Recruiting for officers schools should not be conducted with campaigns and lowered standards but with careful selection and evaluation. It is not a matter of meeting goals and filling empty training slots but one originating from the long-term benefits of the army and the task of protecting the fatherland.

The salaried and actual incomes of many units, agencies, and enterprises are still too disproportionate and require state and army intervention to restrict the differences and create initial steps in equality. This situation, if protracted, will have a serious adverse effect. In the political concept involving the tasks of building the army and protecting the fatherland, it will continue to upset ethnical concepts about the value of labor, trades, intelligence, and culture.

#### **Housing, Employment for Demobilized Soldiers Present Problems**

902E0152A Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Dec 89 pp 1, 4

[Article by Do Quang Bich]

[Text] Each year, in accord with the law on officers, officers who have completed their term of service must be discharged from the military. In particular, in coming years, based on the need to reorganize and reduce the size of the standing army, a large number of cadres and officers will be demobilized. In recent years, a rather large number of soldiers have completed their military obligation and returned to their localities. The same will be true in coming years. Implementing the procedures

and policies on demobilized cadres and soldiers, particularly officers who have served in the military for many years, has become a major problem. The units and localities have striven to implement the procedures and policies for those returning each year, but the needs are very great and many places are encountering difficulties.

First of all, there is the housing problem. In general, housing for the families of military cadres has always been a pressing problem. Because the cadres have frequently had to engage in combat and work far from home, their families have not been able to build and repair houses. This is particularly true in the case of cadres who have participated in the three resistances. At the same time, the state has not clearly defined the responsibilities of the echelons, sectors, and localities. Instead, the military has been entrusted with this task. Thus, even though great efforts have been made and even though material expenditures have been adjusted, the existing sources of capital of the units have been mobilized, and cadres have been mobilized to overcome the difficulties, as compared with the actual needs, very little has been achieved. A situation that is very widespread today is that after serving in the military for many years, officers who have retired and returned to the localities do not have houses, or their houses are very dilapidated. They do not have the capabilities to handle things themselves. According to still incomplete figures, more than 40 percent of the military cadres lack housing. About 30 percent have houses, but the houses are dilapidated and lack area. Only about 16 percent of the military cadres in the cities and 10.9 percent in the rural areas have stable housing. In recent years, with the effort to adjust the national defense budget as allowed by the state and with the great effort made by the units, the military has built a number of housing developments or produced and obtained raw materials and materials and sold them to cadres so they could build and repair their own homes. But as compared with actual needs, this has fallen far short of the mark.

Another major problem concerns the policy of training and giving subsidies to retired military cadres and cadres who have been demobilized and transferred to other sectors, providing jobs, and stabilizing their lives in the period immediately following their discharge and return to the localities. Today, in many cases, when soldiers return to the localities, little attention is given to finding jobs for them or enabling them to build a new life. Some people who were state workers and civil servants before being drafted cannot get their old jobs back at the agencies and enterprises. A number of welfare measures of a social insurance nature, such as the monthly demobilization welfare measures and the change of sector welfare measures, were abolished in 1985, and no new policies have been implemented. The retirement pay of the retired cadres is much lower than the pay they received while on active duty, commodity prices are unstable, they often receive their pay late, and their

living conditions are poor. In many localities, the population registration work is encountering problems. This poses a major obstacle to demobilizing soldiers every year based on the plans.

The people who experience the greatest difficulties when they are transferred from the military to the localities are war invalids. Even though the state has promulgated a number of priority policies, in general, the echelons, sectors, and localities have not given enough attention to helping these people build a new life once their wounds have healed. This is particularly true in the case of providing vocational education and providing them with jobs in accord with their physical capabilities. With the present economic management mechanism, many sectors and localities are afraid to accept or hire these people. The health of most of these people has declined, and their lives are very difficult. Negative phenomena have appeared among a few of the war invalids. This is harmful to the nature of the military and the quality of President Ho's troops.

It will not be possible to overcome the great difficulties in implementing the policies when reducing the size of the standing army unless the state pays attention to these things, unless the sectors and localities take responsibility, and unless all of society makes an effort. In particular, in order to solve the housing problem, which is a major social problem, the state must implement very concrete policies. Each year, the localities must reserve a suitable percentage of the newly built housing for the families of military cadres (in the cities) or allocate land so that the cadres can build their own houses (in the rural areas). For those cadres who build their own houses, part of the building costs must be subsidized. The state must also allocate land, budget funds, and materials to the army to build housing for the families of cadres in the cities and to produce materials for transfer to the cadres in the rural areas.

As for officers, skilled military personnel, and national defense workers who have been discharged from the military but who are still young enough to work, the state must promulgate policies to train and make use of these people and implement social insurance welfare policies for people who have many years of service (between 10 and 20 years) but who cannot retire yet. The state must also determine the responsibilities of the localities and help them with the expenses in providing vocational education and finding jobs for the demobilized officers and skilled servicemen. The state must rehabilitate the skilled servicemen and adjust the policies for them. When war invalids return to the localities, priority must be given to providing them with jobs, helping them in production and life, and encouraging and enabling them to exploit their capabilities in production and business and in rebuilding their lives.

Finally, a misconception that must be avoided is that reducing the size of the military means that we can immediately cut the defense budget. Demobilizing a large number of cadres, officers, and soldiers in a short

period of time will create many complex problem. In formulating and implementing the policies on cadres, officers, skilled soldiers, and defense employees who have retired or who have been demobilized or transferred to another sector, there must be unity about the military policies of the party and state, and the policies that give priority to those who have served in the military for many years and who have contributed and sacrificed much for the independence and freedom of the fatherland must be carried out well. This is not only a policy problem but also a major theme of educational and ideological work. What will youths of draft age, young officers, and those who have volunteered to serve in the military for many years think if their elders, who have made such great contributions and sacrifices, are not treated properly?

#### Minorities Recruited for Resistance Activities

902E0151A Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in  
Vietnamese 24 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by Vu Thanh]

[Excerpts] There are about 60 different minority groups in our country. Their customs, traditions, and living conditions are quite varied and complex. In particular, there are approximately 450,000 Hmong tribesmen living in remote villages along the border in Hoang Lien Son, Ha Tuyen, Lai Chau, Son La, Thanh Hoa, Cao Bang, and Nghe Tinh provinces. [passage omitted]

Because living conditions are still very difficult and because of their special ethnic psychological characteristics, tribesmen in general and the Hmong in particular have great respect for their leaders and medicine men, or wizards. They feel that these people have great powers. The enemy has made great use of these psychological factors to win over and bribe people. They have used tribal leaders and household heads, appointed people to positions, and made these people their lackeys. Because of this, complex problems have arisen frequently in tribal areas, with the high points being banditry and insurrections. [passage omitted]

Today, the United States and the international reactionaries are trying to team up with each other in order to occupy the Hmong tribal areas. Under the banner "Autonomous Hmong Federation of Indochina," they are striving to win back the most reactionary elements among the Hmong who once served as the lackeys of foreign countries. This includes Vang Pao, Vang Chong, Vang Nanh, Giang Mi Tua, and Hoang Xao Chung. They have appointed Vang Pao as head of the so-called "Autonomous Hmong Federation of Indochina." They have transferred the headquarters of this "federation" from Udon, Thailand, to the Golden Triangle. This federation has now united with a number of other reactionary forces in order to form an assault force to attack countries in Southeast Asia. [passage omitted]

The international reactionaries are striving to persuade Hmong lackeys to return for assault training in order to



send them on operations in our country. They control the remnants of the defeated army of Vang Pao and the remnants of the 93d KMT Division, and they are providing food, weapons, medicines, and training officers. They are broadcasting radio programs in these peoples' native languages from two countries in order to incite the tribesmen to attack us.

Starting from this situation, to defeat the enemy's plots in making use of tribesmen in general and the Hmong in particular along our borders, we must carry on many things simultaneously, paying particular attention to studying and grasping the local situation. The Vietnamese nation is composed of many nationalities having different historical roots and varied customs and traditions. The enemy often uses this to appeal to the masses to oppose us. Thus, to keep up with the situation, we must study each nationality. Take the Hmong, for example. In order to have a basis for formulating correct measures, we must establish the relationship between the Hmong living in our country and the Hmong living elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

The truth is, in recent years little attention has been given to grasping the situation in the Hmong areas, especially along the border. Most of the work units have just obtained information on open or relatively open activities. They have not "discovered" things until after they have happened and then tried to handle the results.

This has happened because we have not studied things or launched the masses. Facing this situation, the work of studying things, grasping the situation, launching the masses among the tribesmen, promoting movements to maintain security along the border, and eliminating banditry and the capabilities for stirring up trouble must be strengthened and systematized.

The target and theme of this measure must be to strengthen national solidarity, solidify the political base, promote production, and involve the masses in maintaining political security and social safety.

National solidarity is a very basic theme of the national policy put forth by the party. It is of great importance, and it is a decisive factor in the struggle against the reactionaries in the tribal areas. By thoroughly understanding the party's national policy, we can defeat the enemy's plot to divide the people, particularly their line on establishing an "autonomous Hmong nation," and oppose bigoted nationalism and a national inferiority complex. [passage omitted]

#### **Editorial Reviews Conscription Tasks**

902E0155B Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in  
*Vietnamese* 5 Jan 90 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Recruiting Outstanding Youths for the Army"]

[Text] Military conscription is an annual task aimed at introducing youths of military draft age to service in the

ranks. The Council of Ministers recently assigned 1990 conscription norms to provinces, cities, and special zones directly subordinate to the central government and requested that local areas conduct careful examination and selection to ensure the stipulated quality, numbers, and delivery schedules of quota troops.

The quality requirements of conscripted youths are always emphasized first. During the past few years, although the number of annual conscriptions has declined, the quality requirements demanded are higher to answer the need for building the army in the new period. This year, following the guidance of the Ministry of National Defense, youth conscription prospects will be selected from the 18 to 21 year age group. Exceptions will be those recruited to supplement forces engaged in economic work, a number of youths from the highland provinces, and children of families having no members with military service, with selections made from these groups in higher ages up to 25. The good health of conscripted youths must be ensured with only those in health categories A1, A2, and A3 selected for the army as stipulated by Joint Circular 1054/YT-QP, 1 August 1983, of the Ministries of Public Health and National Defense. Conscripts must not only be young and healthy but also have the proper political and ethical standards; selecting only those with a fourth grade educational level and up. An exception is the ethnic minority region in which a number of literate youths may be recruited for training to serve as core cadres for the local area. During the examination process, selection must properly ensure the policies of draft deferment and waivers as stipulated by the Military Draft Law to ensure conscription equality.

Recently, many local areas have drawn experience from conscription held during 1989. The quality of conscripted youths depends first of all on selection and recruiting held at the local and primary levels. Military draft councils at all levels must uphold responsibility in establishing procedures of registering and managing individuals ready for conscription, conducting accurate and active examination and classification, and positively and promptly developing every preparatory task. Local party committee and administrative echelons must provide good leadership and supervision to sectors and mass organizations in proper recruiting work and education of all people and youths concerning the Military Draft Law for a thorough understanding of the quality requirements of youths conscripted to build the army. It is necessary to rely on the primary level and the masses. Village and subward levels must firmly grasp the ideological changes of youths and their families, and have methods of motivating, persuading, and encouraging youths to enthusiastically depart to fulfill their obligations in protecting the fatherland.

To ensure the accuracy and quality of examination and recruiting, military draft councils must perform following the principles of collectivism, democracy, equality, and openness. It is extremely necessary to strive for the opinions of cadres, party members, and a

majority of the people in the hamlet, village, street and subward, the cadres, workers, and civil servants in the agency, enterprise, etc., to select from those ready for conscription the most outstanding youths, and to fully ensure the political, policy, health and cultural levels, and ethical qualities of those being examined for conscription during this phase. Military draft council members must have a full grasp and clear understanding of each youth eligible for the draft, not making impetuous calls for examination of excessive numbers allowing youths with insufficient standards to be placed on the conscript roster. During 1989 as during previous years, because examination and recruiting at the basic level was not careful, a large number of youths with insufficient health, political, ethical, and cultural levels were conscripted, and a number had to be returned to the local area. Some locations, due to careless examination, even called up those with military deferments, causing the percentage of military losses after troop delivery to be excessively high.

The experience gained by local areas during the past several years in good conscription shows that, if party committee and administrative echelons concentrate on firm leadership and supervision, know how to rely on the masses to achieve good propaganda, education, and motivation of families and youths in proper compliance with the Military Draft Law, and conduct examination and recruiting with equality and openness, anyone

recruited will be a good recruit. Selection quality not only contributes toward determining conscript quality but also saves expenses and time without creating an adverse effect on other political missions in the local area and creates trust among the masses in the conscription task.

## SOCIAL

### Hill Tribe People Enjoy Color TV Programs From Hanoi

*BK0102062690 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese  
1430 GMT 31 Jan 90*

[Text] On the Tet Canh Ngo [year of the horse] New Year days, compatriots of six different ethnic nationalities living along the border area in Lang Son watched color television programs broadcast directly by the Hanoi-based Giang Vo television station.

Compatriots living in Lang Son city; the border districts of Bac Son, Van Quang, and Cao Loc; and part of the districts of Van Lang and Loc Binh were very happy because this was the first time they could enjoy programs from the central television network. This was also proof of the great concern of the party and the state for this border, mountain province.



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23 March 1990